$11.5 million in kickbacks to top Indian politicians and key defense officials to beat its competitor Sofma, France and secure the deal. 5 The guns were used extensively in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999 at elevations of 16000-18000 ft. The Indian army pushed the guns beyond their prescribed limits and used them in ways never before employed by the Swedish Army or Bofors. The guns gave India 'an edge' over Pakistan according to Indian Army officers in the field.
6
There are some features, in the above examples, that we would like to highlight. The decision to select one firm over another is usually not straightforward. The selection of a firm that is best suited for a particular project requires expertise in the subject matter and information about the environment in which the product is to be used. The suppliers themselves may not know if they are best suited. The buyers, firms or governments, rely on agents such as experts or bureaucrats to make the selection decision on their behalf. This creates the scope of corruption. The agents, sometimes but not always, select a non-deserving firm in exchange for bribes. Buyers understand an agent's incentives to select a non-deserving firm. Corrupt agents sometimes get caught and punished. We capture these features in our model.
We analyze the firm's incentives for bribing an agent who selects, on the behalf of the buyer, a deserving firm from two firms that are competing for a project. Only the agent knows if a particular firm is deserving or not. The agent is willing to select a non-deserving firm in the exchange for a bribe. We refer to the selection of a non-deserving firm as a dishonest agent behavior. A dishonest agent behavior hurts the buyer. The buyer understands an agent's incentives and randomly monitors the agent. Monitoring the agent is costly. Upon monitoring, the buyer learns if a non-deserving firm was selected. A dishonest agent, if caught, is punished.
Firms compete in bribes to get selected by the agent. A sufficiently large monitoring eradicates corruption as firms find it unprofitable to offer large bribes that must be offered to compensate the agent's higher expected penalty. For any smaller monitoring corruption prevails. The bribe offer equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The profits of firms increase in the monitoring. This happens because when firms are required to pay higher bribes to be selected with certainty they become less willing to do so. The equilibrium bribes decrease and result in higher profits for the firms.
5 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Key+players+in+Bofors+scandal/1/39264.html; Accessed 06/15/12 6 http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/why-the-army-loves-the-bofors-gun-5580; Accessed 09/05/12
We also find that an increase in monitoring does not always result in more honest agent behavior. Interestingly, if bribery is prevalent, a small increase in the monitoring can make the agent more dishonest. The intuition is the following. If monitoring is small both firms offer bribes with probability one. The agent in this case often accepts the bribe offer of the deserving firm. If monitoring is increased firms become less likely to offer bribes. The agent is now faced with situations in which she receives a bribe offer only from a non-deserving firm. This forces the agent to select a bribe-offering, non-deserving firm more often. The agent becomes more dishonest as a result of higher monitoring. If the monitoring is sufficiently large the agent always selects the deserving firm. Various scholars have discussed this non-monotonic relationship between monitoring, or expected penalty, and honest behavior (see Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) ). However, they draw upon the classic work on intrinsic motivation in psychology (see Deci (1972) ). We present a rational agent model with no behavioral assumptions and show that an increase in monitoring can make the agent more dishonest. In our model, endogenous firm response to an increase in the monitoring makes the agent more dishonest.
The non-monotonic effect of the monitoring on the agent behavior makes it difficult for the buyer to reduce corruption. We find that, the buyer should either choose to be ignorant about corruption or commit to take drastic measures to limit it. A small monitoring only hurts the buyer.
Bribery of foreign government officials by U.S. firms competing in overseas markets was commonplace. During an investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in mid-1970s, more than 400 U.S. companies admitted to having made questionable payments to foreign government officials. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 to bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business system. 7 This unilateral control on the U.S. firms seeking business in foreign markets has been a topic of debate. In the business community it is believed that the Act puts American businesses at a competitive disadvantage in international business (see Kaikati and Label (1980) for a discussion). The evidence from a majority of empirical studies suggests that there is little or no disadvantage posed by the FCPA (see Graham (1984) , Beck, Maher, and Tschoegl (1991), and Wei (2000) ). On the contrary, James R. Hines (1995) 7 See www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (accessed 6/19/12) for the history and details of the Act.
suggests that the FCPA serves to weaken the competitive position of the U.S. firms.
We study the effect of a unilateral anti-corruption control, such as the FCPA, on a firm's profits. We show that the profits of the controlled U.S. firm can actually increase as a result of a unilateral anti-corruption control on it. The intuition is the following. A unilateral anticorruption control on a firm reduces the bribe that the other firm must pay in order to get selected by the agent regardless of whether it is deserving or not. As a result, the agent selects a non-deserving firm with a higher probability. This hurts the buyer. The buyer may, therefore, strategically, set a higher monitoring to discourage bribery by the firm that is not controlled.
Since higher monitoring results in higher profits for both firms, a unilateral control can lead to higher profits for the controlled firm. There is evidence of higher monitoring in the Middle East in the post-FCPA era presented in Gillespie (1987) . She also concludes that the potential of the FCPA to hurt U.S. exports remains unproven.
Related Literature
Corruption has been studied extensively in many different contexts in the literature (See Jain (2001) for a review). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) study the implications of the structure of the corruption network on the level of corruption in government agencies. Mookherjee and Png (1995) study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt (1997) look at bribery, or side payments, in the context of ratings given by salesforce to internal sales support.
There is relatively smaller literature on competition in the presence of corruption. RoseAckerman (1975) initiate this work by presenting a model in which corruption results in allocative inefficiency. The inefficiency in her model arises due to differences in the bribing capacity of competing firms or due to vague preferences of the government. Burguet and Che (2004) allow the agent to manipulate her quality evaluations in exchange for bribes. They find that if the agent has little manipulation power, corruption does not disrupt allocation efficiency but makes the efficient firm compete more aggressively. However, if the agent has substantial manipulation power, corruption facilitates collusion among competing firms and creates allocative inefficiency as bribery makes it costly for the efficient firm to secure a sure win. Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky, and Verdier (2005) incorporate corruption in procurement auction through the possibility for bid readjustment that an agent may provide in exchange for a bribe. They show that corruption facilitates collusion in price between firms and results in a price increase that goes beyond the bribe received by the bureaucrat. They also show that a unilateral anticorruption controls on an efficient firm may restore price competition to some extent. Branco and Villas-Boas (2012) investigate the effect of the degree of competition on corruption in the context of a firm's investment in behaving according to the rules of the market.
This paper also relates to literature on strategic information transmission in the presence of a third party. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) Burguet and Che (2004) . The existing papers do not explicitly model both the agent and the buyer. Our agent is strategic. She understands the implications of dishonest behavior and does not always accept the higher bribe.
The buyer is also strategic. She understands the incentives of the agent and tries to discipline her.
By accommodating these features, which have been largely ignored in the existing literature, we are able to gain interesting new insights on competition in the presence of corruption. We show that an agent can become more dishonest as a result of increased monitoring using a rational agent model. We also provide a formal explanation for the disconnect between the common perception of the impact of the FCPA on the U.S. firms and the findings of the empirical studies.
The findings of our work have important implications for firms doing business in international markets as well as governments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model where we discuss firms' decisions, agent's decision and buyer's decision in order. In Section 3 the analysis of the unilateral control setup and its comparison to the model discussed in Section 2 is presented. Section 4 summarizes our results.
Model
Consider a buyer that needs to buy a single, indivisible good. The suppliers of the product can be one of the two possible types, good fit or bad fit. Utility of the buyer who buys the product at price p is given by Two firms, i = 1, 2, compete to supply the product to the buyer. One of the two firm's product is a good fit, the other's product is a bad fit. The probability that firm i's product is a good fit is 0.5. Firms do not know if their product is a good fit or not. This may happen because firms may not be aware of the intended use of the good, previous training received by buyer's staff, and the environment in which the good will be used or due to the firm's own lack of prior experience. Both firms have same cost of production which is assumed to be zero.
An agent, such as a bureaucrat, selects one of the two firms on behalf of the buyer. The agent, costlessly and privately, learns the fit of the firm. This learning, while informative, is not perfect. The probability that a firm is actually a fit, given the agent's signal is fit, is ρ > 0.5.
The agent is expected to always select the firm for which she receives a fit signal. The agent, in exchange for a bribe . If, however, | b i − b j |≤ λP she selects the deserving firm and receives the bribe offered by that firm, even if it is lower than the bribe offered by the other firm. The agent, acting honestly for buyer, does not pay any penalty in this case. Here, the agent does not accept the non-deserving firm's bribe offer because the cost of doing so in the form of expected penalty (λP ) is weakly higher than the benefit (a bribe higher by ≤ λP ).
We assume that the agent makes an honest decision if she is indifferent to either selecting the deserving or the non-deserving firm. The payoff function of the agent can, therefore, be written
where, b des is the bribe offered by the deserving firm.
A particular firm gets selected by the agent with probability one (zero) if its bribe offer is higher (lower) than the bribe offer of the other firm by more than λP . If the difference in bribes offered is weakly less than λP the agent selects the firm only with probability 0.5, when it is a deserving firm. The expected profit of the firm i as a function of the bribes offered by firm i and firm j = i can be written as
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the actions. In the first stage, nature makes a draw of the fit, from a distribution that is common knowledge, and assigns it to firms. The buyer then sets the probability with which the agent will be monitored after making the firm selection.
Firms then submit simultaneous price and bribe bids to the agent. Next, the agent compares the bids and selects one of the two firms. The selected firm receives the accepted price and delivers the good to the buyer. In the next stage, the buyer randomly monitors the agent and imposes a penalty if a dishonest behavior is inferred. Finally, payoffs are realized. We look for Nash equilibrium in pure as well as mixed strategies. The computation of the mixed strategy equilibrium is similar to that of Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988) .
nature draws fit and assigns it to firms firms submit price bids and bribe offers payoffs are realized buyer sets monitoring frequency agent selects one of the two firms and buyer randomly monitors The framework described above has two important features that are missing in the existing literature on competition in presence of corruption. First, our agent is strategic. She does not always accept the higher bribe. Also, she does not always change her report when she accepts a bribe. There are implications for a dishonest behavior and the agent takes them into account. The buyer is also strategic. She understands the incentives of the agent to cheat.
There are, therefore, consequences for dishonest agent behavior. The buyer, in equilibrium, sets a monitoring which maximizes her payoffs.
Price and Bribe Decisions
In this section the stages of the model that are relevant for the price and the bribe offer decisions of firms are described. A firm is selected by the agent either because it is deserving or because it offers a sufficiently large bribe. The agent can classify a non-deserving firm as a deserving firm.
12 Given this power of the agent, a firm can always benefit by increasing the price bid so long as the price is not rejected by the buyer. Both firms, therefore, submit pricep as their price bid and compete in bribes to be selected by the agent. This leads us to the following result:
Lemma 1 Both firms submit buyer's reservation pricep as their price bid.
This high price bid is a typical result in the literature and has been interpreted as corruption facilitating collusion (see Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky, and Verdier (2005) ).
Firm i, when confronted with a bribe offer b j of the firm j, responds by making a bribe offer that can have three different implications. First, it can offer a bribe which is higher than b j by more than λP and be selected with probability one. Second, it can offer a bribe which is different from b j by, at-most, λP and be selected only if it is deserving. Lastly, it can offer a bribe which is lower than b j by more than λP and be selected with probability zero. However, we note that:
Lemma 2 Firm i responds to a bribe offer b j of firm j by offering a bribe
The intuition for this result is as follows. Any offer b i > b j + λP is strictly dominated by an offer b i − ε for small enough ε. Firm i still gets selected with probability one but offers a smaller bribe. Any bribe offer by firm i such that b j + λP ≥ b i > b j − λP is strictly dominated by the offer b j − λP as firm i still gets selected whenever it deserves but pays a smaller bribe. We do not consider negative bribes, as they are never accepted. Firm i, therefore, responds to bribe offer b j by offering one of the two bribes as specified in Lemma 2.
Now we look at the equilibrium in bribes (proofs are in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 If λ ≥p 2P in equilibrium both firms offer no bribes and the agent selects the firm that is deserving. If λ <p 2P
there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
The intuition behind this proposition is the following. Higher monitoring leads to higher expected penalty for the agent. A higher bribe, therefore, must be offered if a firm expects to be chosen even when it is non-deserving. A deviating firm's profits decrease with an increase in the monitoring. For sufficiently large monitoring (λ ≥p 2P ), gains from deviations are completely erased. In this region, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and firms offer no bribes in equilibrium. Since firms offer no bribes and are selected when they are deserving the equilibrium profit for both firms isp 2 . This profit does not depend on the monitoring chosen by the buyer so long as it is larger thanp 2P .
If the monitoring is lower (λ <p 2P ), the equilibrium bribe offers are in mixed strategies.
Firms respond to the other firm's bribe offer either by offering a higher bribe just enough to secure a sure win or by offering a lower bribe just enough to have the firm selected whenever it is deserving. The best response for a firm changes from a higher bribe offer to a lower bribe offer when the bribe offer of the other firm becomes high enough. This switching happens because profits on overbidding reduces faster than profits on underbidding with the increase in the bribe offer of the other firm. The best response bribe offers start increasing again and the switching happens for the other firm. The cycle continues.
We now characterize the equilibrium mixed strategies for λ <p 2P . If
when it is deserving. If b i < b j − λP the agent does not select firm i. The profit of firm i is given by
which can be written as
where F j (b j ) is the cumulative distribution function for firm j, and ω j (b j ) is the density at bribe b j .
Since the equilibrium bribing strategies depend on the range of monitoring, we specify the mixed strategy equilibrium in two different parameter spaces.
Suppose that λ ≤p 4P . In this range, both firms prefer to offer bribes. Let firm i's bribe offer Since both firms prefer to underbid in response to any bribe offer higher thanp − 3λP , a bribe higher thanp − 2λP will never be offered. Also, since both firms prefer to overbid in response to any bribe offer lower thanp − 3λP , a bribe lower thanp − 4λP will never be offered. The support of bribe offer distribution is, therefore, [p − 4λP,p − 2λP ]. The bribing equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies, is described in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If λ ≤p 4P , (a) equilibrium bribing strategy for firm j is given by
and, (b) both firms make profits of 3λP/2.
The equilibrium bribe distribution, for both firms, is continuous and has a mass point at the indifference point. In equilibrium, both firms offer positive bribes with probability one. The equilibrium is unique by construction. And it is straightforward to show, by contradiction, that the bribing strategies specified in Proposition 2 constitute Nash equilibrium.
It is of interest to look at how the equilibrium bribing strategies and profits respond to a small change in monitoring. An increase in monitoring requires that firms overbid their rivals by a larger amount if they wish to be selected with certainty. Given that both firms still offer bribes with probability one, it might appear counter-intuitive to see that profits are increasing in monitoring λ. The intuition for this result is the following. Since firms must overbid by a larger amount to get selected with probability one they become less willing to do so. Firms become indifferent to overbidding or underbidding the rival firm at lower bribes. As a consequence, lower bribes are offered in equilibrium which results in higher profits for both firms. We can express each point in the support of the distribution in equation (2) in the formp − aλP , where 2 ≥ a ≥ 4. This implies that the probability at each point in the support of bribe distribution is independent of λ.
We now look at the intermediate range of monitoringp 4P ≤ λ ≤p 2P . Given λ ≤p 2P , both firms prefer to offer bribes if the other firm is not offering a bribe. Firms prefer to overbid by λP on any rival firm's bid which is smaller thanp 2 − λP . Since λ ≥p 4P , the alternative strategy, as per Lemma 2, is to offer no bribes that yields lower profits. Here, firms also prefer to underbid on any rival firm's bid which is larger than λP . Since firms prefer to overbid only in response to bribe offers smaller thanp 2 − λP , a bribe higher thanp 2 is not offered. If a firm makes a bribe offer b ∈ p 2 − λP, λP it must be in response to a bribe offer higher thanp 2 . However, since there are no bribe offers larger thanp 2 there are no bribe offers made in the interval p 2 − λP, λP . The support of the bribe offer distribution therefore is 0,p 2 − λP ∪ λP,p 2 . The equilibrium bribing strategies and profits, in this range of monitoring, are given in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Ifp
(a) equilibrium bribing strategy for firm j is given by .
The distribution is continuous in its support. There are two mass points for each firm, one at b = 0 and the other at b =p 2 − λP . This equilibrium is also unique; it can be easily shown that the bribing strategies specified in Proposition 3 constitute Nash equilibrium. Firms do not offer bribes with probability one in this range of monitoring. As monitoring is increased, firms offer bribes with smaller probability. This happens in response to the higher amount by which firms must overbid their bribe in order to be selected with certainty. The firm profits are increasing in monitoring but at a smaller rate compared to the rate of increase in the λ ≤p 4P case. The lower bound on bribes, at zero, causes profits to increase at a slower rate. We also note that there is no discontinuity in the bribe offer distribution or the firm profits at the boundaries of this parameter space.
Agent's Selection Decision
Having described the price and bribe offer decisions in the entire range of monitoring, we now look at agent behavior. We are interested in an agent's decision to select a non-deserving firm as it is this decision that hurts the buyer. The agent does not always select a non-deserving firm when she accepts a bribe. If the difference of bribes offered by the two firms is smaller than the expected loss that the agent incurs upon selecting a non-deserving firm, the agent simply selects and accepts the bribe from the firm that is deserving. Since firms do not know if they are deserving or not, they cannot condition their bribe payments on being non-deserving. The agent selects a firm with certainty only when the bribe offers are different by more than λP . However, selecting a firm with certainty does not imply that the agent is selecting a non-deserving firm.
Note that the firms are deserving with probability 0.5. We can write the probability P r with which the agent selects a non-deserving firm as
The probability P r is computed using the equilibrium bribe distributions specified above. These results are also presented graphically in Figure 2 . We note two observations that were discussed earlier. First, an increase in monitoring λ increases the cost of selecting a non-deserving firm to the agent. And firms respond to higher monitoring by offering smaller or no bribes. Yet an increase in monitoring has no effect on an agent's decision to select a non-deserving firm when monitoring is sufficiently small. Even more puzzling is the increase in P r with monitoring in the intermediate range. both firms offer strictly positive bribes with probability one. When both firms offer bribes the agent often selects the deserving firm and accepts the bribe offered by it. Since both firms offer bribes for sure in this range of monitoring the probability with which the agent selects a non-deserving firm does not change. If monitoring probability is increased beyondp 4P , firms become less likely to offer bribes. The agent is now faced with situations in which she receives a bribe offer only from a non-deserving firm. This makes the selection of a non-deserving firm more likely. As monitoring is further increased, firms become very unlikely to offer bribes. Therefore, the probability with which the agent selects a non-deserving firm also decreases. For a sufficiently large monitoring (λ ≥p 2P ), firms do not offer bribes and, therefore, the agent does not select a non-deserving firm.
Insensitivity to or increase in dishonest behavior as a result of increased monitoring, or penalty, has been widely reported in various contexts. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) find the dishonesty of test takers insensitive to monitoring. Several studies originating from Deci (1972) show in experiments that an increase in the monitoring can result in more dishonest behavior.
Most related to our work is a study reported by Schulze and Frank (2003) where they show that increase in monitoring can make an agent, making a procurement decision on behalf of a principal, more dishonest as a result of monitoring. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) draw on the behavioral literature and present models to derive these results.
We present a rational agent model without any behavioral assumptions and show that dishonesty can be insensitive to or can even be increasing in the monitoring. This result has important implications for buyers as well as firms in markets where corruption is prevalent.
Monitoring Decision
If a firm is fit the agent finds it deserving only with probability ρ. Therefore, if the agent makes an honest decision to select the deserving firm she selects a fit firm only with probability ρ. The payoff of the buyer is v with probability ρ and zero with probability 1 − ρ. Similarly, if the agent selects a non-deserving firm the buyer gets a payoff of v with probability 1 − ρ and a payoff of zero with probability ρ. The probability P r with which the agent selects a non-deserving firm is discussed in the previous section. We can write the expected payoff of the buyer as
We first look at π G | c(λ)=0 . The expressions of P r as given in the proof of Proposition 4 are substituted in equation (4) to get
Note that λ enters π G | c(λ)=0 only through the probability P r with which the agent selects a non-deserving firm. It is now straightforward to understand how π G | c(λ)=0 changes with monitoring λ. For λ ≤p 4P , the probability P r does not depend on λ, therefore π G | c(λ)=0 also does not depend on λ. Forp 4P ≤ λ ≤p 2P , the probability P r first increases and then decreases to zero, therefore π G | c(λ)=0 first decreases and then increases to maximum value at λ =p 2P . For λ ≥p 4P , it stays at its maximum value which is ρv −p. These results are graphically presented in Figure 3 . It is now simple to look at the buyer's choice of λ under cost of monitoring c (λ).
Buyer's payoff at zero monitoring π G (λ = 0) is ρv −p − (2ρ − 1) 9ln
is not optimal. Also since c (λ) > 0, optimal λ cannot be larger thanp 2P . There is no extra benefit of increasing λ beyond p 2P
to the buyer as the agent behaves as desired at all λ ≥p 2P . Therefore, buyer chooses optimal λ from the set 0, λ ,p 2P , whereλ ∈ p 4P
,p 2P is the monitoring at which
We see buyer as making one of the two choices. She either accepts corruption with zero anticorruption enforcement or limits corruption, partially or fully, by setting a λ ∈ λ ,p 2P . The buyer's choice to limit the corruption or not depends on which is defined as
ρv−p →λ λ → The buyer sets the monitoring at either zero or at a sufficiently large value. A small monitoring does not make the buyer any better as the agent selects the non-deserving firm with the same or higher probability. A buyer selecting a positive λ expects the agent to select the non-deserving firm with a lower probability than she does when no monitoring is enforced. This happens only when λ >λ. The buyer setting a non-zero monitoring incurs a cost. If the cost is higher than the benefit that the buyer enjoys due to more honest agent behavior, the buyer sets monitoring at zero. If not, the buyer sets monitoring sufficiently large and limits corruption. In the case when the buyer allows corruption with zero anti-corruption enforcement the firms make zero profits. All the surplus is transferred to the agent in the form of bribes. However, if the buyer limits corruption firms make expected profits ofp
. If the buyer eliminates corruption by setting monitoring atp 2P the firms make expected profits ofp 2 , which is the highest profit that the firms can make in this symmetric set-up.
We next look at the role of c λ =p 2P , which is relevant to the analysis presented in the next section. Corruption is eradicated at the monitoring of λ =p 2P . The buyer eradicates corruption only if the cost at λ =p 2P is smaller than the increase in profit the buyer enjoys as a result of honest agent behavior compared to no monitoring. This gives
The above equation, while necessary, is not sufficient for corruption eradication. There may be a λ ∈ λ ,p 2P that dominates eradication. While the condition c λ =p 2P > (2ρ − 1) 9ln
implies that corruption is not eradicated, equation (7) implies that the buyer limits the corruption, partially or completely.
Buyers either choose to be ignorant or commit to take drastic measures to limit corruption.
It is never optimal for the buyer to set monitoring in the interval 0,λ . A small anti-corruption effort does not reduce corruption.
13 Singapore and Hong Kong were once corruption infested.
However, as they implemented drastic measures to combat corruption, they have almost completely eradicated it. The efforts to limit corruption in many other emerging economies appear half-hearted. The impact on prevalence of corruption is therefore little, if any.
Unilateral Control
In this section, we consider that one of the firms, say firm i, as required by the law in its home country, does not offer bribes to the agent. The structure and timing of the game is exactly as in the previous section. As before both firms make a price bid ofp. The firm j either does not offer a bribe or it offers a bribe of λP . We assume that if firm j is indifferent between offering and not offering a bribe it does not offer a bribe. If firm j does not offer any bribe the agent selects the firm that is deserving. Both firms make an expected profit ofp 2 in this case. However, if firm j offers a bribe of λP the agent selects firm j with probability one. Any lower bribe does not make the agent select a non-deserving firm j. Any higher bribe is strictly dominated by λP .
If firm j offers a bribe it makes a profit ofp − λP and firm i makes zero profit.
If λ ≥p 2P , in equilibrium both firms offer no bribes. A possible deviation for the firm j is to offer a bribe of λP and make a profit ofp − λP . However, given λ ≥p 2P the deviation is not more profitable than the equilibrium strategy. Similarly, if λ <p 2P , firm j offers a bribe of λP in equilibrium. The buyer gets her valuation v with probability ρ if the agent selects the deserving firm, whereas she gets v only with probability 1 2 if the agent selects firm j with certainty. The payoff of the buyer is
These payoffs, assuming c (λ) = 0, are shown in Figure 4 . We can now look at the buyer's decision to set monitoring. One striking result in the above proposition is that a unilateral anti-corruption control can actually benefit the firm that is being restricted from offering a bribe. A unilateral control on one firm eliminates competition in bribes. The firm that is not controlled can offer just λP and be selected with certainty. This makes the selection of a non-deserving firm by the agent more likely. The buyer may, strategically, set a higher monitoring to discourage bribery by the firm that is not controlled. This results in higher profits for a unilaterally controlled firm. A firm under unilateral control can be worse off as well. This happens if, in the absence of unilateral control, the buyer sets a non-zero monitoring, but with unilateral control the buyer sets zero monitoring. A steep increase in the cost beforep 2P can make the elimination of corruption unattractive for the buyer. If buyer's decision to set monitoring does not change as unilateral control is introduced, the profits of the controlled firm remain unchanged.
The firm that is not controlled benefits from the unilateral control on the other firm. For the controlled firm the benefit comes as a result of the buyer setting higher monitoring. The firm that is not controlled also benefits when the buyer sets zero monitoring. Without unilateral control all the surplus was transferred to the agent in the process of competitive bribing. But with unilateral control on the other firm, a firm makes higher profits as it offers a bribe of only λP . We think that claims about competitive disadvantage faced by the controlled firm originate from this comparison where the buyer sets monitoring at zero. If the buyer sets monitoring at zero the firm that is not controlled is selected by the agent and makes higher profits than the controlled firm, which makes zero profits. However, what is not taken into consideration is that even if the unilateral control is not there the firm would still make zero profits.
The higher profits for the controlled firm results due to the buyer's choice of higher monitoring. There is some evidence of such increased monitoring. Gillespie (1987) We have no reason to believe that these efforts are only in response to the increased FCPA enforcements. However, we believe that this increase in the FCPA enforcements will make the U.S. firms better off as foreign governments take measures to limit corruption.
Conclusion
This paper studies competition in a corrupt market. The buyer lacks the expertise or the information needed to evaluate firms. An agent selects the firm for the buyer. This creates scope of corruption. Sometimes, the agent selects a non-deserving firm in exchange for bribes.
Both the buyer and the agent are strategic. The competitive bidding behavior of the ex-ante symmetric firms is examined. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in bribes exists only if the monitoring of the agent is sufficiently large. The expected penalty to the agent is so large that firms find it unprofitable to offer such a large bribe. The agent selects the deserving firm.
If monitoring is not sufficiently large the bribe offer equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The agent selects a non-deserving firm if its bribe offer is sufficiently larger than the bribe offer of the deserving firm. Otherwise, the agent accepts the bribe offer of the deserving firm and selects it.
We find that an increase in the monitoring does not always result in more honest agent behavior.
It sometimes backfires. This agent behavior originates due to the endogenous bribe offers made by firms.
The non-monotonic agent behavior in response to changes in the monitoring, or anti-corruption efforts, makes it difficult for the buyer to reduce corruption. If bribery is prevalent, a small change in the monitoring does not reduce corruption. The buyer must take drastic measures if she wishes to curb corruption.
We find that a unilateral anti-corruption control on a firm, such as the FCPA of 1977, can result in higher profits for the controlled firm. A direct effect of the anti-corruption control is that it makes the foreign government worse off by making the selection of a non-deserving firm by the agent more likely. The foreign government may strategically set a higher monitoring.
Profits of the controlled firm may increase as a result. We resolve the disconnect between the prevailing perception about the FCPA in the business community and findings of the empirical studies. Higher monitoring set by the foreign government in response to the FCPA is the key to higher profits of a controlled firm. There is some evidence of increase in anti-corruption enforcements by foreign governments in response to the FCPA.
The findings of this work have important implications for firms conducting business in emerging markets, buyers in these markets and the US government. US firms should note that the debate about the competitive disadvantage posed by the FCPA may be misplaced. Also, while governments in the emerging economies may be disinterested in reducing corruption, it is in the interest of firms to support the anti-corruption efforts. Buyers should either ignore corruption or take drastic measures to limit it. Implication for the US government is that the unilateral anti-corruption control should be aggressively enforced as it not only reduces corruption but may also increase profits of US firms. The model can be applied to various settings where an agent makes a decision, such as awarding certification, issuing permit, law enforcement or procurement, on behalf of a principal and the principal lacks the expertise or the information to make the same decision.
Proof of Proposition 1
Profit of each firm in equilibrium isp 2 . The best possible deviation for a firm is to make a bribe offer of λP and get selected with probability one. Profit of the firm under this deviation is p − λP . However, deviation is not profitable given λ ≥p 2P . The agent also has no profitable deviations. Hence, no bribes are offered in equilibrium.
Now, we show that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for λ <p 2P .
Suppose b * i , b * j is a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies. Then there is no other Therefore, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof of Proposition 2
We prove Proposition 2 in following steps.
Step 1 If firm i offersp − 3λP firm j would be indifferent between overbidding and underbidding.
Suppose firm i bidsb i . Firm j can bidb i +λP (+ infinitesimally small ε) and get selected with probability one or bidb i − λP and get selected with probability 
Step 2 Step 3 The equilibrium bribing strategy sets S * i and S * j are convex. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose there is an interval
h <p − 2λP and firm i offers b i ∈ I with probability zero.
Claim 1 Firm j offers b j ∈ (I + λP ) ∪ (I − λP ) with probability zero.
Suppose firm j offers b ∈ I + λP with positive probability. Since f (b i ) = 0 for b i ∈ I, firm j can offer inf (I + λP ) and make higher profit than offering any b ∈ I + λP . Therefore,
Suppose firm j offers b ∈ I − λP with positive probability. Since f (b i ) = 0 for b i ∈ I, firm j can offer inf (I − λP ) and make higher profit than offering any b ∈ I − λP . Therefore,
Claim 2 Firm i offering b i ∈ I with probability zero and firm j offering b j ∈ (I + λP ) ∪ (I − λP ) with probability zero constitutes a contradiction.
Using equation (1), we can write
profit of firm i when offering b k is strictly higher than offeringb contradicting the assumption of an equilibrium.
Step 4 There can be a mass point in the bribe distribution of a firm only at b =p − 3λP .
Suppose firm j has a mass point at b
We can write
Subtracting 2nd equation from 1st we get
For small enough ε > 0,
and firm i by shifting some density from bottom to top of b * + λP can be strictly better off. So there can not be a mass point at b * ∈ [p − 4λP,p − 3λP ). Now suppose firm j has a mass point at b * ∈ (p − 3λP,p − 2λP ].
As before, we get
for small enough ε. Therefore, there cannot be a mass point in this range as well.
From above it is clear that firm j (and by the same argument firm i also) can have mass point only at b * =p − 3λP .
Step 5 Equilibrium profits for both firms are Firm i is playing a mixed strategy so it must be indifferent between offering any bribe in it's support including b i =p − 3λP . Profit for firm i can be written using equation (1) as
. Proof for firm j is similar.
Step 6 Both firms have mass points at b =p − 3λP .
Suppose ω j (p − 3λP ) = 0. Using equation (1), we can write
. Therefore, F j (p − 3λP ) = 1 2 . Now again using equation (1), we write
Substituting F j (p − 3λP ), we get π i = λP . We got a contradiction. The proof for firm i is identical.
Step 7 , and ω j (p − 3λP ) = . The proof for firm i is identical.
Step 8 Equilibrium bribing strategy for firm j is given by Applying appropriate transformations to above three equations proves Step 8.
Since the proof of Proposition 3 is similar to that of proposition 2, we only provide the steps here.
Step 1 If a firm makes a bribe offer ofp 2 − λP the other firm will be indifferent between offering a bribe higher by λP and offering no bribe. It prefers to overbid on smaller offers. This holds given λ ≥p 4P .
Step 2 If a firm makes a bribe offer b ≥ λP the other firm prefers to offer b − λP . This also holds given λ ≥p 4P .
Step 3 − λP, λP .
Step 4 There are no holes in the interval 0,p 2 − λP and in the interval λP,p 2 .
Step 5 There is no density at b = λP for both firms. Because, if there is firms can strictly benefit by moving density from b = λP to b =p 2 − λP .
Step 6 Both firms make profits ofp . This is obtained by evaluating equation (1) at
Step 7 There is a mass point of at b =p 2 − λP for both firms.
Step 8 Using equation (1) and
Step 6 we can write
Using
Step 2, Step 7, above equation and applying appropriate transformations we get the cdf given in Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
(a) λ ≤p 4P case Using equation (3), we can write P r as 
It is straightforward to check that P r λ =p 4P = 9 ln 9 8 − 1 ; P r λ =p 2P = 0 and,
∂P r ∂λ
The maxima of the P r function is numerically calculated. It is found to be at λ The firm i makes zero profits under unilateral control. In the absence of the unilateral control the buyer does not find it optimal to completely eliminate corruption. However, for cost curve that become very steep as they approach λ =p 2P the buyer might find it optimal to set a λ ∈ λ ,p 2P . Therefore, in this case the controlled firm will either make the same or lower but not higher profits compared to if it was not controlled.
